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Abstract
We examine the view that high-quality macroeconomic policy is
a necessary, but not suﬃcient, condition for economic growth. We
ﬁrst construct a new index of the quality of macroeconomic policy.
We then directly compare growth rate distributions across countries
with good and bad policies; use Bayesian methods to examine the
partial correlation between policy and growth; and outline how growth
and steady-state income levels might have diﬀered, had all countries
achieved good policy outcomes. One ﬁnding is that bad macroeconomic
policies can be oﬀset by other factors, but the fastest-growing countries
in our sample all shared high-quality macroeconomic management.
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The belief that economic growth requires sound macroeconomic policy is a
central element of development orthodoxy. Even those sceptical about that
orthodoxy will often agree that macroeconomic stability is a precondition for
successful economic development. At the broadest level, the macroeconomic
stability of East Asian countries between the early 1960s and the late 1990s
could help to explain why East Asian countries have sustained high growth
rates. In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America have endured a
painful combination of macroeconomic disarray and slow growth.
As most economists would expect, macroeconomic mismanagement could
explain not only slow growth, but also why some developing countries have
become heavily indebted. Even if slow growth is attributed to problems
with external debt, the origins of a debt crisis can typically be traced back
to policy decisions. Easterly (2002) ﬁnds that the group of highly indebted
poor countries (the HIPCs) had worse macroeconomic policies over 1980-97
than other developing countries, even after controlling for income levels.
Although these various observations may seem convincing, the strength
of the empirical relationship between macroeconomic policy and growth con-
tinues to be disputed. One argument is that, even where there is some
evidence of a correlation, it arises only because of slow growth in countries
with terrible policies. Once the quality of policy is above a certain threshold,
the marginal eﬀect of better policy on growth could be minimal. Another
argument, which dates back to at least Sala-i-Martin (1991), is that macro-
economic disarray could be a symptom of deeper problems. Recent research,
especially following the work of Acemoglu et al. (2001) on institutions, has
argued that policies typically lack explanatory power relative to institutional
weaknesses.
In this paper, we revisit the relationship between macroeconomic policy
and growth. This is well-worked ground, and a new paper on this topic must
try hard to justify its existence. We depart from the existing literature in at
least four ways. First, we seek to avoid some of the weaknesses of past work
by constructing a new composite index of the quality of macroeconomic pol-
icy. We use an outlier-robust version of principal components analysis to
1aggregate ﬁve diﬀerent policy indicators. Our new composite index is corre-
lated with previous measures of policy quality, such as the well-known index
used by Burnside and Dollar (2000) in their study of the eﬀectiveness of
foreign aid. But the new index also has some advantages over previous mea-
sures for the questions we investigate here, and perhaps in future research
on a variety of related topics.
Second, we examine a popular and important hypothesis in more detail
than usual. Much of the commentary on macroeconomic policy and growth
can be reduced to a very simple hypothesis: sound policy is a necessary but
not suﬃcient condition for rapid growth; bad policy is a suﬃcient condition
for slow growth. We call this the ‘weakest link’ view, because growth per-
formance is only as strong as the weakest link in a set of policy outcomes.
Rapid growth relies on simultaneously achieving a number of goals and, if
any one of these is absent, growth will swiftly come to a halt.
Although this is a common view of the role of policy, previous research
has not explored its empirical implications in any detail. We use direct com-
parisons of growth rate distributions, where countries are classed into groups
according to our new policy indicator. We ﬁnd that the extent of support
for the popular view is less than overwhelming. In particular, even when
a country ranks low in terms of macroeconomic policy, this is not a suﬃ-
cient condition for slow growth. We do ﬁnd, however, that sustained rapid
growth is conﬁned to a set of countries with high-quality macroeconomic
management.
Third, we examine in more detail how growth and policy are related.
We ﬁrst use orthodox growth regressions to quantify the eﬀects of macro-
economic policy over the period 1970-99, restricting the sample to devel-
oping countries. This approach has been widely used, but suﬀers from a
number of important weaknesses, not least the model uncertainty problem
highlighted by Levine and Renelt (1992). We therefore supplement these
simple regressions with Bayesian methods for model averaging, which allow
us to investigate sensitivity to the regression speciﬁcation in a systematic
way. Drawing on a set of many other candidate predictors, we ﬁnd some
evidence that the new macroeconomic policy indicator matters for growth,
and strong evidence that government decisions matter when a wider range
2of decisions are taken into account.
More precisely, in a BMA exercise that closely follows Sala-i-Martin et
al. (2004), we ﬁnd that the best-performing models nearly always contain
at least one of three macroeconomic policy variables (one of which is our
new indicator) regardless of variation in the rest of the speciﬁcation. Hence,
we establish relatively strong evidence that macroeconomic policies help
to explain variation in growth rates across developing countries, even when
model uncertainty is taken into account. We also look at whether the eﬀect of
macroeconomic policy is robust to the inclusion of measures of institutional
quality.
Finally, we use our main regression results to construct counterfactual
distributions of growth rates and steady-state levels of GDP per capita. We
can then see what might have happened, had all developing countries shared
the same quality of policy throughout the last thirty years of the twentieth
c e n t u r y .O n es i m p l ed e v i c ei st os e tt h em a c r o e c o n o m i cp o l i c yi n d e xf o ra l l
countries to the value for Malaysia, the country at the 95th percentile of
policy quality, and then compute counterfactual growth rates and steady-
state income levels. This shows the extent to which the distributions of
growth rates and steady-state income levels might have looked diﬀerent, if
countries had shared the same quality of policy. We can also see whether
bad policy accounts for the shape of the international distribution of output
per worker, including the “twin peaks” pattern identiﬁed by Quah in a series
of papers (for example, Quah 1996).
The main conclusions of our analysis are as follows. In general, countries
with good macroeconomic policies appear to grow more quickly. Neverthe-
less, some countries have grown reasonably quickly despite weak policy. This
implies that bad macroeconomic management is not a suﬃcient condition
for slow growth, and can sometimes be oﬀset by strengths elsewhere. At the
same time, we show the fastest growth rates are conﬁned to countries with
high-quality macroeconomic policies. In this respect, there is some support
for the macroeconomic orthodoxies of the Washington Consensus, at least
as a long-run proposition.1
1It is worth noting that the paper does not address the subtler and much more diﬃcult
questions that relate to short-run policy activism such as demand management. Our
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂyr e v i e w s
the existing literature on policy and growth, and then discusses the ‘weakest
link’ view in more detail. Section 3 will describe our construction of a new
measure of the quality of policy. Section 4 will then use this measure to
group countries into those with good and bad policies, before comparing the
unconditional distributions of growth rates across these two groups, to exam-
ine the ‘weakest link’ view. Section 5 presents a more conventional analysis
based on growth regressions, while section 6 examines the robustness of the
policy eﬀect to changes in the regression speciﬁcation, using recently de-
veloped Bayesian methods. Section 7 uses the core growth regressions to
generate counterfactual distributions of growth rates and steady-state levels
of income. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Relation to existing literature
The literature on policy and growth has traditionally emphasized short-run
macroeconomic management and trade policy. We will focus throughout on
the eﬀects of macroeconomic policy, partly because it is relatively easy to
measure, and partly because attempts to impose macroeconomic orthodoxy
are often controversial in practice. Motivated by these considerations, cross-
country studies such as Bleaney (1996) and Fischer (1991, 1993) investigated
the role of macroeconomic stability in sustaining growth, and tended to
argue that policy plays a vital role.
The account of this literature in Easterly (2005) emphasizes the shift that
has taken place in recent years. Initially, commentators on development of-
t e na r g u e dt h a tp o l i c yd i ﬀerences could account for most of the post-1960
variation in developing country growth rates. This belief has been under-
m i n e di ns e v e r a lw a y s .I ti sn o td i ﬃcult to ﬁnd examples of countries that
have stagnated despite orthodox macroeconomic policies. The time series
variation in policy and growth is not especially supportive, either. Im-
provements in policy indicators explain relatively few growth accelerations
(Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 2005) and in general policy indicators are
results concern macroeconomic policy assessed over the long run and should be interpreted
in that light; they do not imply, for example, that budget deﬁcits must always be avoided.
4far more persistent than growth rates, suggesting that policy will usually
leave at least the medium-run variation in growth unexplained (Easterly et
al. 1993).
Looking at the broader picture, macroeconomic policy has generally
improved over time, whereas developing country growth performance was
weaker in the 1980s and 1990s than previously. The reasons for the post-1980
growth collapse in developing countries are discussed in Easterly (2001b)
and Rodrik (1999) and appear more complicated than a simple ‘bad pol-
icy’ story.2 Finally, some studies, notably Easterly and Levine (2003), have
found that growth and policy variables are not robustly correlated in the
cross-country data when controlling for institutional development.
With all this in mind, some recent contributions have suggested that the
role of macroeconomic policy is typically overstated. Perhaps bad policies
are best seen as a symptom of deeper underlying problems, such as insti-
tutional weaknesses. Since macroeconomic disarray is often associated with
several problems at once, it is often argued that it will be hard to disentangle
the eﬀects of speciﬁc policies from one another, let alone other growth de-
terminants. This is an important motivation for constructing an aggregate
index of the quality of policy, an approach that is central to this paper.
Although some of the claims for the importance of policy may be exag-
gerated, another hypothesis continues to have more general support: it is
often argued that high quality macroeconomic management is a necessary,
but not suﬃcient, condition for rapid growth. Performance is only as strong
as the weakest link in a set of policy outcomes. This view has come to dom-
inate assessments of the role of policy (for example, Easterly 2005) but has
had relatively little impact on theory and empirical methods.3
An especially clear and persuasive exposition of the ‘weakest link’ view
can be found in Easterly (2001a). He indicates that governments may not
be able to initiate growth, but can certainly destroy any prospect of growth
2Although it could be argued that macroeconomic mismanagement, as well as bad luck,
played a signiﬁcant role in the external debt crisis of the 1980s. The slow growth of that
decade might then be attributed partly to policy decisions in the 1970s, as well as the oil
shocks and the rise in world real interest rates.
3An exception is Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005), who provide an analytical
framework for isolating the binding growth constraints in a particular setting.
5if macroeconomic policies are bad enough. He illustrates the consequences
of policy errors using several historical examples, showing that the worst
policy outcomes - hyperinﬂation, high black market premia, large budget
deﬁc i t s-a r et y p i c a l l ya s s o c i a t e dw i t hs l o wg r o w t ho re v e nc o l l a p s e si no u t -
put. None of this implies, however, that getting macroeconomic policy right
is a suﬃcient condition for rapid growth. It is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd examples
of countries with sound macroeconomic policies and slow growth.
If good macroeconomic policies are necessary but not suﬃcient for growth,
this has implications for the kinds of empirical model that should be esti-
mated. For example, the idea could be captured by a simple nonlinear model
with two regimes:
g = γ0 + ε0 if P<P ∗ (1)
= γ1 + αP + β0Z + ε1 if P ≥ P∗
where g is the growth rate, P indicates the quality of macroeconomic pol-
icy, Z is a vector of other growth determinants, γ0,γ 1 and α are parameters
and β is a parameter vector. High values of P indicate good macroeco-
nomic policies. If the quality of policy falls below a threshold value P∗,
governments eﬀectively destroy any prospect of growth (given a low value
of γ0 and a low variance of the error term ε0) regardless of other country
characteristics.
This contrasts with the linear models that dominate the growth litera-
ture:
g = γ + αP + β0Z + ε (2)
in which bad policies can be oﬀset by other factors, and growth varies
smoothly with the policy indicator, without any kind of threshold eﬀect.
Clearly there will be circumstances in which the alternative models (1) and
( 2 )a r en o tg r e a t l yd i ﬀerent. But it is worth noting that the conventional
model (2) builds in a policy-growth relationship somewhat diﬀerent from
the ‘necessary condition’ or ‘weakest link’ view that is embedded in many
informal accounts.
We do not examine models with thresholds, but instead consider a po-
tentially more general testable implication. If the ‘weakest link’ view is
6right, we should expect to see that countries with bad policies have growth
rates that are tightly distributed around a low mean, because bad policy is a
suﬃcient condition for slow growth. In contrast, where countries have good
policies, we should observe much wider dispersion in growth rates around a
higher mean. The wide dispersion arises because countries with good poli-
cies may not have other growth preconditions in place, leading to variation
in performance across these countries, driven by variation in other growth
determinants. If we divide countries into groups with good and bad policy,
the distributions of growth rates across countries might look like the hypo-
thetical example in ﬁg u r e1 :t h es o l i dl i n er e p r e s e n t sap o s s i b l ed i s t r i b u t i o n
for countries with bad policy, while the dashed line represents a possible
distribution for countries with good policy.
With this in mind, our paper will pay less attention to the conditional
mean of the growth rate than is usual. Instead, we compare the shape of the
entire growth rate distribution across countries with good and bad policies.
In some of our empirical work, we will use box-plots and kernel density
estimates to examine whether the patterns look similar to the hypothetical
pattern we sketched in ﬁgure 1. In general, good policies are associated with
higher growth rates, but there is substantial variation for both groups. In
other words, some countries have grown moderately quickly despite weak
policy on average. But it is also worth noting that the highest growth rates
in our sample are conﬁned to countries with high-quality macroeconomic
policies.
It is important to emphasize that our work shares important deﬁcien-
cies with other empirical research on policy and growth. One especially
important criticism, articulated in Rodrik (2005), is that policy outcomes
- ultimately representing decision variables - must be endogenous to social
and economic circumstances, calling into question the usual exogeneity as-
sumptions. In terms of the statistical and microeconometric literature on
treatment eﬀects, the assignment of treatments (government policies) is not
randomized, and nor is it likely to be “ignorable” in the technical sense
of that term. This implies that policy indicators will almost certainly be
correlated with country characteristics that are not observed by the econo-
metrician.
7In cross-section research of the kind we pursue here, the solutions to this
problem are limited, not least because the literature has arguably failed to
identify a genuinely convincing instrument for the quality of macroeconomic
policy. Nevertheless, it remains interesting to see whether policy and growth
are related in the cross-country data. This is especially so, given some recent
claims that macroeconomic policies are only a small part of the development
story.
3 Measuring macroeconomic policy
In this section, we discuss our indicators of the quality of macroeconomic
policy, representing an important element of the Washington Consensus. We
will combine several indicators to measure the overall quality of policy over
1970-99. This has a number of advantages. From a statistical point of view,
it will tend to lessen the outlier problems associated with skewed distrib-
utions, and help to alleviate measurement error. From an economic point
of view, the new index aims to measure an underlying latent variable, the
quality of the macroeconomic decision-making process, rather than seeking
to rely on more speciﬁcp o s s i b l e‘ s y m p t o m s ’l i k eh i g hi n ﬂation. This ap-
proach may work especially well when, as suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1991),
macroeconomic disarray tends to be associated with undesirable outcomes
on a range of indicators.
It is important to note that we are not seeking to examine all elements of
the Washington Consensus. As initially summarized by Williamson (1990),
the Consensus enshrines principles that go well beyond macroeconomic poli-
cies. These include the need for tax reform, ﬁnancial liberalization, liberal-
ized trade policy, openness to foreign direct investment, privatization, dereg-
ulation, and the protection of private property rights.4 An examination of
t h e s ed i m e n s i o n si sw e l lb e y o n dt h es c o p eo ft h i sp a p e r ,a n dw o u l dt a k eu s
into many diﬀerent controversies. Fischer (2003) argues that, although an
over-simpliﬁcation, the policies associated with the Washington Consensus
4Modern development orthodoxy, as promoted by the Washington institutions, extends
to even more aspects of policy. Rodrik (2002) characterizes an ‘augmented’ Washington
consensus.
8are still “a useful shorthand description of a major part of a desirable basic
policy orientation” (2003, page 6).
We focus on the potential importance of macroeconomic policies in that
“basic policy orientation”. We will consider, in particular, the roles of ﬁscal
discipline, inﬂation and exchange rate management.5 We measure average
performance in these areas over thirty years, 1970-1999. We combine the
individual indicators to obtain an index of policy quality for this period,
using either a classical principal components analysis (PCA) or a robust
extension of PCA based on the minimum covariance determinant method of
Rousseeuw (1984). Our empirical analysis will focus on developing countries
with available data, but excluding transition economies, and small countries
where the 1970 population size was below 250,000.
We now describe the individual policy indicators that we will use to
construct a composite index. To capture ﬁscal disclipine we use data on the
average central government budget surplus as a share of GDP (SURPLUS)
over 1970-99.6 Some countries, notably Guyana and Sudan, have extreme
negative values for this variable, reﬂecting persistently high budget deﬁcits.
Our principal components analysis, and hence our later results, are robust to
either excluding these countries, or replacing SURPLUS with the monotonic
but bounded transformation arctan(SURPLUS).7
To measure success in keeping inﬂation low, we construct a variable
INFLA. This is the natural logarithm of one plus the median inﬂation rate
over 1970-99, computed from the GDP deﬂator. We use the median inﬂation
rate to capture success in keeping inﬂation low on average; relative to the
more standard use of the mean, this measure is less likely to be dominated
5For a related approach, including additional dimensions of the Washington Consensus,
see Berr et al. (2005).
6Although we have also experimented with including the stock of central government
debt relative to GDP, the latter variable is available for a smaller number of countries,
and so we use SURPLUS in what follows.
7This transformation is a natural choice, given that the variable is a ratio which can take
on extreme values in either direction, positive or negative. The arctan(x) function maps
x into the smallest or most basic angle with tangent x. When the angle is expressed in
radians, the values of the arctan function will be restricted to the interval (−π/2,π/2)a n d
this will limit the eﬀect of outlying observations. When the transformation is applied to
SURPLUS, the lowest value is less than one standard deviation below the mean, compared
to ﬁve standard deviations below in the raw data.
9by a small number of hyperinﬂation episodes, at least where these are short-
lived.
We use three measures that relate to various aspects of exchange rate
management. These are the black market premium (BMP), an index of
currency overvaluation or real exchange rate distortion (OVERVALU) and
a measure of the variability in exchange rate distortions (ERATE). The
black market premium reﬂects departures of an illegal, market-determined
exchange rate from the oﬃcial exchange rate. To lessen outlier problems,
our variable BMP is deﬁned as the natural logarithm of one plus the mean
value of the black market premium over the period.
The two variables OVERVALU and ERATE were introduced in Dollar
(1992) and, in the case of OVERVALU, extended forwards and backwards by
Easterly and Sewadeh (2002). The ﬁrst of these measures is based on eval-
uating price levels in a common currency, after correcting for the possible
eﬀects of factor endowments on the prices of non-tradeables. This correction
is achieved by using the component of price levels that is orthogonal to GDP
per capita and its square, population density and two regional dummies. If a
country’s price level is higher than predicted by these controls, this indicates
the domestic prices for tradeables may be relatively high, and so high values
of OVERVALU could indicate real overvaluation and trade restrictions. In
contrast, low values of OVERVALU may be associated with outward orien-
tation. This measure has sometimes been criticised, particularly as an index
of trade restrictions; we discuss these issues in Appendix 1.
The ﬁnal measure of exchange rate management we use is denoted ER-
ATE. This is Dollar’s measure of variability in the overvaluation index for
1976-85 (see Table A1 in his 1992 paper). It can be seen as measuring in-
stability in exchange rate management but, given the likely role of inﬂation
in generating movements in the overvaluation index, may also be an indi-
cator of more general forms of macroeconomic instability (Rodriguez and
Rodrik 2000). A possible danger here is that ERATE may partly reﬂect
political instability, with eﬀects that are distinct from macroeconomic mis-
management. We do not adopt other measures of policy variability for this
reason.
Although sometimes we will use the ﬁve policy indicators individually, for
10most of our analysis we aggregate them into a composite index. This index
is designed to capture the overall quality of macroeconomic policy. Con-
structing such an index helps in several ways: it reduces the measurement
error associated with taking a single indicator as a proxy for the quality of
policy, and helps to limit the inﬂuence of outlying observations. The use of
a composite index also acknowledges a basic limitation of the cross-country
data. It will be diﬃcult to identify the separate eﬀects of ﬁscal discipline,
inﬂation control and exchange rate management in small cross-country data
sets. Instead, it makes sense to reduce the dimensions of the problem and
focus on a single index of policy quality. Arguably, there is more hope of
answering questions about policy and growth reliably when policy is delib-
erately characterized in these broad terms.
The best-known macroeconomic policy index in the recent literature is
that of Burnside and Dollar (2000). They construct an aggregate measure
of policy quality based on three indicators: inﬂation, the budget surplus
and the Sachs-Warner (1995) indicator of openness to trade.8 Since their
central focus is a possible interaction between the growth eﬀects of aid and
the quality of policy, they weight the policy indicators using the coeﬃcients
in a simple regression of growth on the indicators, and controls including
initial GDP, regional dummies and proxies for political stability. Note that
this procedure is much less well-suited to our purposes than to those of
Burnside and Dollar. In their procedure, growth will typically be correlated
with the aggregate policy index by construction. Here we want to compare
distributions of growth rates across countries with good and bad policies,
and for this it makes sense to use a composite policy index that makes no
use of information on growth rates.
To construct our composite index, we use a principal components analy-
sis. This takes p speciﬁc indicators and yields new indices (the principal
components) P1,P 2,...Pp that are mutually uncorrelated and capture dif-
ferent dimensions of the data. In our work we standardize the indicators
to have unit variance; equivalently, we base the principal components on
8They also experiment with the use of government consumption as a share of GDP, but
ﬁnd this variable to be negatively correlated with the budget surplus, and insigniﬁcant
when the budget surplus is included. See Burnside and Dollar (2000, p. 850).
11the correlation matrix rather than the covariance matrix. We use solely the
ﬁrst principal component. Formally, this is deﬁned by a vector of weights
a =( a1,a 2,...,a p)0 on the (standardized) indicators X1,X 2,...Xp such that
the linear combination
P1 = a1X1 + a2X2 + ... + apXp
has the maximum variance for any possible choice of weights, subject to the
sum-of-squares normalization that a0a =1 . We use this method to aggregate
diﬀerent sets of components into a new measure of policy quality. A key
assumption here is that a well-measured aggregate index can be written as
a linear function of the policy indicators.
To recap, our policy indicators are the budget surplus, inﬂation, the
black market premium, real exchange rate distortions and real exchange
rate volatility.9 First of all, we check that the correlations between these
variables are high enough to justify using principal components: in the ex-
treme case, where the variables were all pairwise uncorrelated, a principal
components analysis would not make any sense. Testing for this “spheric-
ity” case, allowing for sampling variability in the correlations, is a standard
problem in multivariate analysis. We implement a Bartlett-type likelihood
ratio test, where our precise test statistic is:








as in Flury and Riedwyl (1988, p. 203). Here n is the number of cases
(here, countries) and the λj are the eigenvalues associated with the p princi-
pal components j =1 ,...,p. Under the assumption of multivariate normality,
this statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with p(p+1)/2−1
degrees of freedom. For the ﬁrst principal components analysis we report
below, the test statistic is 60.97 with 14 degrees of freedom, and so we
comfortably reject sphericity at the 1% level.
9In a previous analysis we also used data on real interest rates, since low rates often in-
dicate ﬁnancial repression. The component loading for the real interest rate was eﬀectively
zero, and we therefore exclude it from the construction of our preferred measure.
12We always normalize the ﬁrst principal component in such a way that
high values indicate good policy. The structure of our ﬁrst composite index
can be seen in Table 1, which shows the correlations between the policy
indicators and the ﬁrst two principal components. In terms of standard-
ized variables (all with mean zero and unit variance) we can write our ﬁrst
composite index as
MACRO =0 .334 ∗ SURPLUS − 0.447 ∗ INFLA− 0.585 ∗ BMP(3)
−0.347 ∗ OVERVALU − 0.475 ∗ ERATE
This index places most weight on the black market premium and the
Dollar (1992) measure of variability in exchange rate distortions. The ﬁrst
principal component explains 42 per cent of the total variance in the stan-
dardized data. According to this index, the governments that were most
successful in managing their macroeconomic conditions during 1970-1999
were Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Panama and Benin. In contrast, the
analysis suggests that the quality of policy was unusually low in Nicaragua,
Guyana, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia.
A drawback of any principal components analysis, especially in a sample
of the current size, is that it may be highly sensitive to outlying observations.
As Hubert et al. (2005) note, a classical principal components analysis is
maximizing the variance and decomposing the covariance matrix, and both
the variance and the covariance matrix can be highly sensitive to anomalous
observations. This is an important concern when aggregating measures of
macroeconomic policy. Easterly (2005) points out that the empirical distri-
butions of policy indicators are often heavily skewed, with a small number
of countries experiencing policies that are unusually bad (several standard
deviations from the mean) relative to other developing countries.
For this reason, we also use methods for constructing outlier-robust prin-
cipal components. Since we have ﬁve policy indicators and so relatively few
dimensions, we can easily implement the minimum covariance determinant
(MCD) method. This is based on identifying the particular subset of h<n
observations, among the many possible subsets of the total set of n obser-
vations, for which the classical covariance matrix has the smallest determi-
nant (a method due to Rousseeuw 1984, p. 877; see also Rousseeuw and
13van Driessen 1999). We can then use the covariance matrix for just these h
observations to represent the associations among the variables, and to com-
pute the eigenvectors associated with the principal components. We use the
standard choice h =0 .75n so that the method eﬀectively discards the least
representative 25% of the cases in estimating the correlations, building in a
high degree of robustness.10
Using this approach to estimating correlations, we can extract outlier-
robust principal components. The correlations between the ﬁrst two of these
new principal components, and the policy indicators, are shown in column
(2) of Table 1. In terms of loadings on the individual variables, the robust
composite indicator can be written as:
RMACRO =0 .101 ∗ SURPLUS0 − 0.578 ∗ INFLA0 − 0.693 ∗ BMP0 (4)
−0.219 ∗ OVERVALU0 − 0.357 ∗ ERATE0
where the 0 on the individual variables indicates that each has been
centred using a robust estimate of their location. Relative to the classical
PCA, the outlier-robust PCA places less weight on SURPLUS, OVERVALU
and ERATE,a n dm o r ew e i g h to nINFLA and BMP. Although the weights
in (3) and (4) may look rather diﬀerent, the simple correlation between
MACRO and RMACRO is 0.98. Using the RMACRO index, the ﬁve best
performing countries are Singapore, Thailand, Panama, Malaysia and Togo,
and the ﬁve worst performing countries are Nicaragua, Uganda, Ghana,
Argentina and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
An alternative approach for a PCA is to use the diagnostic plot suggested
by Hubert et al. (2005). Using this plot we can identify possible outliers,
which are then excluded from a classical principal components analysis. This
method indicated that Guyana, Nicaragua and Sudan might be anomalous
observations. On excluding them, we obtain the results in column (3) of
Table 1. The proportion of variance explained by the ﬁrst principal com-
ponent falls slightly, but the correlations between this component and the
10We use the ROBPCA program for S-Plus to implement the MCD approach. Note that
the simpler alternative of identifying outliers from bivariate scatter plots is ﬂawed, because
it will not always detect observations that are outliers in a multidimensional space.
14diﬀerent indicators are very similar to those reported in column (1). This
suggests that, although in principle there is some potential for variation in
the aggregate policy indicators to be driven by unusual cases, the indices we
use are robust to outlying observations.
It is interesting to note brieﬂy the correlations between our new measures
of policy quality, and those previously used in the literature. Table 2 shows
the correlations between MACRO, RMACRO, the Burnside-Dollar index,
and an updated Burnside-Dollar index for 1970-97 due to Easterly, Levine
and Roodman (2004). The correlations are suﬃciently high that the various
indices could be measuring similar aspects of performance. The is the case
even though the Burnside-Dollar and Easterly et al. measures use a very
diﬀerent weighting strategy and additional information, from the Sachs-
Warner measure of trade policy.
4 When is policy the weakest link?
First of all, we look at how growth varies across countries with good and
bad policies. We order the countries by their values of the composite policy
indicator RMACRO, and split the sample at the 33rd and 66th percentiles.
This gives us three groups of countries. We want to investigate how the
mean and standard deviation of the growth rate varies across these groups.
We measure growth as the annual growth rate in GDP per capita (chain-
weighted) over 1970-99, using data from version 6.1 of the Penn World Table,
due to Heston et al. (2002).
In ﬁgure 2, we present Tukey box-plots of the growth rate. The upper and
lower limits of the enclosed box correspond to the 75th and 25th percentiles
of the growth rate, while the horizontal line within the box corresponds to
the median. Looking across ﬁgure 2, we can see that the median growth rate
is substantially lower in group 1 (with the worst policies) than in groups 2
and 3. There is less support for the idea that bad policy always destroys
l o n g - t e r mg r o w t hp r o s p e c t s ,b e c a u s ee v e ni ng r o u p1 ,t h e7 5 t hp e r c e n t i l e
o ft h eg r o w t hr a t ei s1 . 4 % . W eﬁnd similar patterns (not shown) if we
measure growth in terms of GDP per worker (rather than per capita) and
if we classify countries according to MACRO rather than RMACRO.
15In ﬁgure 3 we use kernel density plots to summarize the same information
in a slightly diﬀerent way.11 We exclude the intermediate group, for clarity.
The solid line in the ﬁgure shows the distribution of growth rates for the
group with the worst policies, while the dashed line shows the distribution
for the group with the best policies.
The ﬁgure shows that growth is systematically higher with good policies
(since the distribution is further to the right for countries with good policies).
Contrary to the “weakest link” view we discussed earlier, bad policy does not
necessarily preclude growth. There is substantial variation in growth across
the countries with bad policy, and a signiﬁcant fraction of them display
positive growth rates over the thirty-year period. Nevertheless, there are no
countries growing at more than 3.5% a year in the bad policy group, whereas
there are seven countries that grew at least this rapidly in the good policy
group (Cyprus, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, South Korea and
Thailand). On this evidence, avoiding bad macroeconomic policy outcomes
is a necessary condition for sustaining high growth rates over a long period.
We have examined similar ﬁgures (not shown) for all ﬁve individual in-
dicators, SURPLUS, INFLA, BMP, OVERVALU and ERATE.12 The pat-
terns in these ﬁgures are generally less supportive of the idea that good
policy promotes growth. This suggests that combining the separate indica-
tors into an overall index is a useful step. The evidence that policy matters
is strongest for the Dollar index of exchange rate distortions (OVERVALU)
and the black-market premium (BMP). In ﬁgure 4 we present box-plots for
countries grouped according to the black-market premium.
5 Macroeconomic policy and growth regressions
In this section, we examine the relationship between macroeconomic policy
a n dg r o w t hi nam o r eo r t h o d o xw a y ,u s i n gg r o w t hr e g r e s s i o n s .L a t e ri nt h e
paper, we will use these simple OLS regressions to compute counterfactual
distributions of growth rates and steady-state income levels.
11The samples are relatively small to apply these methods, and the choice of bandwidth
becomes important. We discuss this choice in Appendix 2.
12Easterly (2005) also looks at this issue, using bar charts, and using short-run variation
in the data to a greater extent than here.
16A natural starting point for any growth regression is the empirical model
introduced by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). We estimate a version of
their model using data for 1970-1999 (their original sample was for 1960-
1985). We show that, conditional on the ‘Solow determinants’ of growth,
notably investment shares, population growth, and initial income, growth
has a robust partial correlation with our indices of macroeconomic policy.
The eﬀect is not only robust, but also sizeable. In our main regressions, an
improvement in the quality of policy by one standard deviation would have
raised the annual growth rate by around 0.5-0.7 percentage points over this
period.
The Mankiw, Romer and Weil regression model is standard and we do
not discuss it in detail here. Brieﬂy, we regress the log diﬀerence in GDP
per capita on the log of the investment share, the log of initial GDP per
capita, the log of population growth plus 0.05, and a human capital vari-
able. There are two main departures in our speciﬁcation. First, we include
regional dummies in all speciﬁcations; these can be motivated partly as
proxies for the unobservable variable initial eﬃciency, as in Temple (1998).
Second, we do not use the rate of investment in human capital, but instead
a measure of the initial level of educational attainment.13 We measure edu-
cational attainment using the natural logarithm of either the 1970 literacy
rate, or average years of schooling in 1970, where the literacy data are from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2004) and the schooling
data are from Barro and Lee (2000). In each case, the ﬁgure relates to the
population aged 15 and over.
First of all, we look at a growth regression that excludes the policy
indicators; this can be seen in column (1) of Table 3. These results show that
the original MRW results are fairly robust to using data over a diﬀerent time
period; the explanatory power is similar to the MRW regressions, although
the eﬀect of population growth is imprecisely estimated in this developing
country sample.
In column (2) we look at a simple regression that includes only initial in-
13T h eu s eo fas t o c km e a s u r ec a nb ej u s t i ﬁed formally as a proxy for the steady-state
level of educational attainment, as in equation (12) in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992, p.
418).
17come, regional dummies and the robust policy index RMACRO. The index is
signiﬁcant at the 5% level and has a sizeable eﬀect: a one-standard-deviation
increase in the quality of policy would have raised the annual growth rate
by 0.71 percentage points over this thirty-year time period. In column (3)
we control for the eﬀects of investment and population growth; the eﬀect of
RMACRO is weaker, but remains signiﬁcant at 12%. The reduction in the
size of the coeﬃc i e n ts u g g e s t st h a tt h ee ﬀects of macroeconomic manage-
m e n tm a yw o r kp a r t l yv i at h ei n v e s t m e n tr a t e ,a ni d e at h a tw ee x p l o r ei n
more detail below.
In column (4) we add the logarithm of the 1970 literacy rate, which
increases the explanatory power of the regression. RMACRO is once again
signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and a one-standard-deviation increase in this
v a r i a b l ew o u l dr a i s et h eg r o w t hr a t eb y0 . 6 5p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t s .T h i sr e s u l ti s
robust to replacing the literacy rate with average years of schooling in 1970,
as in column (5). This reduces the size of the sample by 10 observations.
The partial correlations between growth and our policy indicator do not
appear to be driven by anomalous observations. The results are robust to
the deletion of potential outliers, as identiﬁed by median (least absolute
deviation) regression.14 Our ﬁndings are similarly robust to using single-
case diagnostics such as DFITS and DFBETA, which identify a similar set
of outliers to the LAD method.15 We have also used added-variable plots
(not shown) to identify potential outliers. On excluding Nicaragua and
t h eD e m o c r a t i cR e p u b l i co fC o n g o ,t h er e s u l t sa r es l i g h t l yl e s ss t r o n g ,i n
that RMACRO is now signiﬁcant only at the 8 per cent level. Finally,
we also carry out some simple diagnostic tests. These suggest the models
do not suﬀer from omitted structure (based on Ramsey’s RESET statistic)
or heteroskedasticity (based on versions of the Breusch-Pagan and White
tests) except in the regression that includes investment but not a measure
of human capital (column 3).
Overall these results suggest that, conditional on the Solow growth de-
14To identify potential outliers, we estimate the models using the LAD estimator, and
then deﬁne outliers as countries whose LAD residuals are more than two standard devia-
tions from the mean value.
15The results are available upon request. See Cook and Uchida (2003, p. 153-54) for a
brief discussion of how DFITS and DFBETA are computed and used.
18terminants and regional dummies, the quality of macroeconomic policy has
some explanatory power for growth rates. An increase in the policy index of
one standard deviation translates into an annual growth rate that is between
0.5 and 0.7 percentage points higher over a thirty-year period. Increasing
the annual growth rate by 0.7 percentage points would leave GDP per capita
higher by 22% at the end of the thirty years. Later in the paper, we will use
these results to explore the role of policy in more detail, including the eﬀects
on the location and shape of the distributions of growth rates and steady-
state income levels. Before then, we examine the robustness of the partial
correlation between growth and policy, using recently developed Bayesian
methods.
6R o b u s t n e s s
Since Levine and Renelt (1992) it has often been argued that partial cor-
relations in the empirical growth literature are not robust to changes in
speciﬁcation. This is a serious problem for growth researchers, because the
list of candidate predictors is long and it is not easy to rule out variables
on a priori grounds. Put diﬀerently, there is a model uncertainty problem,
and the standard errors in any speciﬁc regression will tend to understate
the extent of uncertainty about the parameters. In this section, we address
this problem using Bayesian methods for model averaging as in Brock et al.
(2003), Fernandez et al. (2002), Raftery (1995), Raftery et al. (1997) and
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). In what follows we refer to the latter paper as
SDM.
Brock et al. (2003), Malik and Temple (2005) and SDM all discuss ap-
plications of Bayesian model averaging to economic problems, and so we
discuss the main ideas only brieﬂy, drawing on the presentation in Raftery
(1995).16 Recall that Bayesians treat parameters as random variables, and
aim to summarize uncertainty about these parameters in terms of a proba-
bility distribution. The natural extension to model uncertainty is to regard
the identity of the true model as unknown, and summarize our uncertainty
16For those interested in learning more about the key ideas, the discussion in Raftery
(1995) is highly recommended.
19about the data generating process in terms of a probability distribution over
the model space. By explicitly treating the identity of the true model as in-
herently unknowable, but assigning probabilities to diﬀerent models, it is
possible to summarize the ‘global’ uncertainty about parameters in a way
that acknowledges model uncertainty.
We consider the case of K possible models, and assume throughout that
one of these models generated the observed data D.W ed e n o t et h em o d e l s
by M1...MK and their corresponding parameter vectors by θk.T h eB a y e s i a n
approach to model uncertainty is to assign a prior probability to each model,
p(Mk), as well as a prior probability distribution p(θk | Mk) to the para-
meters of each model. Using this structure a Bayesian can then carry out
inference on a quantity of interest, such as a slope parameter, by using the
full posterior distribution. In the presence of model uncertainty, this distri-
bution is a weighted average of the posterior distributions under all possible
models, where the weights are the posterior probabilities that a given model
generated the data (Leamer 1978).
To illustrate in the case of just two possible models, the full posterior
distribution of a parameter of interest ∆ c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
p(∆ | D)=p(∆ | D,M1)p(M1 | D)+p(∆ | D,M2)p(M2 | D)
Here p(∆ | D,Mk) are the conventional posterior distributions obtained
under a given model and the terms p(Mk | D) are the posterior model
probabilities, namely the probability, given a prior and conditional on having
observed D,t h a tm o d e lMk is the one that generated the data.
This approach requires the evaluation of posterior model probabilities.
Brieﬂy, as in Raftery (1995), Raftery et al. (1997) and Sala-i-Martin et
al. (2004), we use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)o fS c h w a r z
(1978) to approximate the Bayes factors that are needed to compute the
posterior model probabilities. We can then implement a systematic form of
model selection, and conduct inference in a way that acknowledges model
uncertainty. For example, we can easily investigate the hypothesis that a
slope coeﬃcient βz is non-zero, by summing the posterior model probabilities
for all models in which βz 6=0 .
As the list of candidate predictors becomes longer, there quickly comes
20a point where estimation of all the possible models is not feasible, and at-
t e n t i o nm u s tb er e s t r i c t e dt oas u b s e t .W eu s et h ea p p r o a c ho fR a f t e r ye t
al. (1997), where a branch-and-bounds search algorithm is used to iden-
tify a subset of models with high posterior probability. We provide some
additional details on our implementation of BMA methods in Appendix 3.17
We complement the standard BMA methods (based on the BIC approxi-
mation) with the more sophisticated approach of Hoeting et al. (1996). This
is because a potentially serious problem in the empirical study of growth
data is that outliers may be present. Where some observations are unrep-
resentative, this could easily lead to some variables being assigned a high
posterior probability of inclusion, and others not, where the majority of the
data would point to a diﬀerent conclusion. In general, any procedure for
dealing with model uncertainty (or even just model selection) may be inﬂu-
enced by outliers. Even if steps are taken to identify these observations, the
ﬁnal results can easily depend on the order in which model selection and
outlier detection is carried out.
Hoeting et al. (1996) suggest a procedure for addressing this issue. First,
the full model (containing all the candidate predictors) is estimated by an
outlier-robust estimator due to Rousseeuw (1984), and the standardized
residuals used to identify possible outliers. Then model averaging is carried
out but, as in Hoeting et al. (1996), a ‘model’ is deﬁned as (1) a joint set
of candidate predictors and (2) a set of observations identiﬁed as outliers,
w h e r et h el a t t e ra r es o m eo ra l lo ft h o s ei d e n t i ﬁed in the ﬁrst stage. (This
restriction is used to keep the dimensionality of the problem manageable.)
Then a Markov chain Monte Carlo model composition (MC3)a p p r o a c h ,a s
in Madigan and York (1995), is used to approximate the posterior model
probabilities. For more details of this approach, see Hoeting et al. (1996).
Here, we are interested in seeing whether RMACRO is a robust deter-
minant of growth. Our list of candidate predictors is taken from SDM, who
seek to explain diﬀerences in growth rates over 1960-1996 for 88 countries
(developing and developed). We modify their analysis by measuring growth
17For a more general summary of how the approach is implemented and used to compute
posterior model probabilities, and a discussion of the necessary assumptions, see Appendix
1 of Malik and Temple (2005).
21over 1970-99, and replacing their measure of initial GDP for 1960 with a
measure for 1970. Despite the change in time period, we can continue to
use the same candidate predictors as SDM, since the majority of their ex-
planatory variables were chosen precisely because they are ﬁxed over time
or likely to change only slowly. In practice, to keep the application of BMA
methods manageable, we focus on the 31 variables in SDM that have a pos-
terior probability of inclusion greater than 4% (based on their Table 2, p.
824). It is worth noting that one of these variables is Dollar’s original in-
dex of real exchange rate distortions, measured for 1976-85. This has a low
posterior inclusion probability, just 8.2%, in the main results of SDM.
O n ec h a n g ew em a k er e l a t i v et oS D Mi st h a tw es o m e t i m e st r a n s f o r m
some of the explanatory variables to reduce outlier problems. The variables
concerned are the relative price of investment goods, population density in
coastal areas in 1965, and overall population density in 1960, all of which
have highly skewed distributions. In some of our analysis, we use the natural
logarithms of these variables, rather than simply entering them in levels.
When we combine the SDM data set with the data on our policy measure,
RMACRO, our sample is reduced to 63 developing countries. In some of
what follows, we extend the country coverage by imputing missing values
for a small number of variables. This allows us to increase the number of
countries to 72.18 The decision to impute missing values involves a trade-
oﬀ: w ei n t r o d u c em e a s u r e m e n te r r o r ,b u ta tt h es a m et i m ew eb r i n gt o
bear additional information (for the extra countries) and lessen the biases
that occur when data are missing in non-random ways. Here, the number of
imputed values in the design matrix (containing the data on the explanatory
variables) is just 21, representing fewer than 1% of the total number of cells
in the design matrix (32 × 72 = 2304).
In thinking about which sample is most appropriate, it is worth antic-
ipating one aspect of our ﬁndings. The evidence that policy has explana-
t o r yp o w e ri sa l w a y sm u c hs t r o n g e ri nt h e7 2 - c o u n t r ys a m p l et h a ni nt h e
63-country sample. The reason for this is clear, if we inspect the values
of RMACRO for the nine countries that are added in moving to the 72-
18The country missing from our earlier 73-country growth regression sample is Burkina
Faso, which is not included in the SDM data set.
22c o u n t r ys a m p l e . T h e s en i n ec o u n t r i e si n c l u d ef o u rt h a ta r ei nt h eb o t t o m
decile for RMACRO (Guyana, Iran, Nicaragua and Sierra Leone) and three
that are in the top two deciles (Cyprus, Chad and Fiji). Hence, in moving
to the larger sample, we are increasing the representation of countries at the
extreme ends of the macroeconomic policy quality distribution.
At one level, the addition of the extra countries, with their relatively
extreme outcomes for policy, clearly adds a great deal of identifying variation
t ot h ed a t as e t . A tt h es a m et i m e ,w em u s th a v ec o n s i d e r a b l ef a i t ht h a t
growth and policy are reliably measured for these countries, if we are to give
more weight to the results for the larger sample. Otherwise, there is a risk
that the results will be driven by a misleading set of observations. This is
related to a more general debate about the appropriate response to ‘good’
and ‘bad’ leverage points, those observations with unusual values for the
independent variables (see Temple 2000 for more discussion). Rather than
attempt to take sides in this debate, we present results for both samples.
Readers can then draw their own conclusions from the evidence presented.
We do not report the full BMA results in detail, and instead focus on the
posterior inclusion probability associated with RMACRO.T h i si st h es u mo f
the posterior model probabilities for all models in which the variable appears.
This is very low in the sample of 63 countries: just 1% or 2.5%, depending on
whether we transform the three explanatory variables mentioned previously.
The posterior probability of inclusion becomes 100% when we move to the
full sample of 72 countries, however. The relevant posterior mean - the
weighted average of the coeﬃcients on RMACRO across all models, where
the weights are the posterior model probabilities - is 0.51. This is close to
the coeﬃcients estimated in the previous section using growth regressions
b a s e do nt h eM R Wm o d e l .
The evidence for an eﬀect of macroeconomic policy also becomes much
stronger, even in the 63-country sample, if we exclude government invest-
ment as a share of GDP (measured for 1970-74) from the candidate predic-
tors. This suggests that, at least conditional on other growth determinants,
the macroeconomic policy index and government investment each capture,
in slightly diﬀerent ways, aspects of government decision-making that are
23relevant to growth.19 It is also worth noting that SDM’s government invest-
ment variable, which tends to hide any eﬀect of RMACRO in the 63-country
sample, has a highly skewed distribution. The potential distorting eﬀect of
outliers on the regression surface may explain why RMACRO is highly sen-
sitive to its inclusion.
Given this point and the overall sensitivity to the sample, a more robust
version of BMA may be preferable. We therefore implement the outlier-
robust MC3 approach of Hoeting et al. (1996) and ﬁnd a general pattern
similar to the previous results. One interesting feature of these results is that
Dollar’s original index of real exchange rate distortions has a high posterior
inclusion probability, 87%, in the 63-country sample, and even higher (99%)
in the 72-country sample. The evidence for a separate eﬀect of RMACRO is
weak, but becomes much stronger if we exclude Dollar’s index. The posterior
probability of inclusion of RMACRO then rises to 69% in the 72-country
sample.20
Finally, we look at the question of whether the eﬀects of macroeconomic
policy are robust to the inclusion of measures of institutions. Acemoglu et
al. (2003) and Easterly and Levine (2003) have argued that macroeconomic
disarray may be a symptom of institutional weaknesses; after conditioning
on measures of institutional quality, these authors ﬁnd the eﬀects of macro-
economic policy to be weak. Easterly (2005) concludes that “the long run
eﬀect of policies on development is diﬃcult to discern once you also control
for institutions” (page 1055).
To investigate this, we consider the relationship between growth and
policy, when adding four measures of institutions to the BMA exercises.21
19At ﬁrst glance, the role of the government investment share is consistent with the
general view of Easterly (2001a) that slow growth is often associated with short-term
behaviour by governments. The problem here is that the government investment share
is usually negatively signed: high government investment is associated with low growth.
When we use outlier-robust methods, however, the posterior inclusion probability of the
government investment variable is much lower - below 10%.
20A remaining possibility is that the eﬀect of policy on growth is nonlinear. But the
BMA results are similar when we replace RMACRO with a dummy variable that is equal to
one for the countries in the lowest third of the RMACRO distribution, and zero otherwise.
21To keep the number of candidate predictors manageable, this sometimes requires us
to use slightly fewer of the original SDM variables. We then drop those with relatively
low posterior inclusion probabilities in the SDM paper.
24These are the extent of democracy, based on the POLITY IV database of
Marshall and Jaggers (2000), and averaged over 1970-99; a measure of the
extent of political constraints due to Henisz (2000), again averaged over
1970-1999; a composite index of the quality of governance for 1996-2000,
due to Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005); and the measure of aver-
age expropriation risk for 1985-95 used in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001). It is worth noting that several of these measures are based on out-
comes rather than constraints, and this could lead us to exaggerate the
eﬀects of institutions, and understate the eﬀects of policy.22
Initially, we exclude the expropriation risk measure because it reduces
t h es a m p l eo fc o u n t r i e s .W h e nw ea d dt h eo t h e rt h r e em e a s u r e so fi n s t i t u -
tions to our previous BMA, the posterior inclusion probability of RMACRO
is again very sensitive to the sample. In the 63-country sample, the poste-
rior inclusion probability for RMACRO is just 0.8%, but in the 72-country
sample it is 97.4%. If we use the outlier robust MC3 approach, the inclusion
probability of RMACRO is 3% in the 63-country sample, and 53% in the
72-country sample. Incidentally, the results also strongly support the hy-
pothesis that growth and institutions are highly correlated. The Kaufmann
et al. (2005) measure dominates the other institutions measures, with an
inclusion probability of 100%. The inclusion probabilities for the democracy
and Henisz measures never exceed 35%.
When we also include the expropriation risk measure, the sample is re-
duced to 56 countries. The posterior inclusion probability of RMACRO is
very high in this sample (96.8%) and the Kaufmann et al. measure (100%)
continues to outperform the other measures of institutional quality. The
Henisz and democracy measures have inclusion probabilities in the 40%-50%
range, while expropriation risk adds little in terms of explanatory power,
with an inclusion probability of just 0.1%.
Past work, notably Levine and Renelt (1992), has argued that the partial
correlation between policy and growth is not robust to the choice of control
variables. In some ways, our ﬁndings are consistent with that widely held
view. When we allow for a wide range of possible growth determinants, the
22See Glaeser et al. (2004) on the general desirability of using measures of constraints
or rules, rather than measures closely related to equilibrium outcomes.
25evidence that the speciﬁcp o l i c yi n d e xRMACRO matters for growth is less
than overwhelming. But if we take a broader view of government policy,
there is a stronger case that it makes a diﬀerence. In our Bayesian model
averaging exercises, at least one of three variables - RMACRO,t h es h a r e
of government investment in GDP, and Dollar’s index of real exchange rate
distortions - always has a high posterior inclusion probability.
Expressed diﬀerently, nearly all the best-performing models include at
least one of these variables, regardless of how the rest of the speciﬁcation
varies. We also ﬁnd some tentative evidence that macroeconomic policy
matters even when taking into account institutional quality (or perhaps
more properly, measures of outcomes that are primarily associated with
institutions). This suggests that policy helps to explain some of the variation
in growth rates across developing countries. The next section will examine
this in more detail.
7 Counterfactual distributions
This section attempts to place the size of the macroeconomic policy eﬀect in
broader perspective. One interesting way to assess the eﬀects of macroeco-
nomic policy is to construct a counterfactual distribution, for either growth
rates or steady-state levels of income. We can then see what might have
happened if all countries had followed the same macroeconomic policies over
1970-99.23
That is the task we undertake in this section, using estimates of the
eﬀects of policy obtained from the previous regression results. An advantage
of this approach is that we can see where in the distribution the role of
policy may have been especially important, information that is not directly
apparent from regression estimates. We can also see the extent to which
bad macroeconomic policies might account for the pattern of “twin peaks”,
or bimodality, sometimes identiﬁed in the distribution of income per capita
levels (Quah 1996).
23Kernel density estimates of counterfactual distributions are associated in particular
with the work of DiNardo et al. (1997) on wage distributions. These methods have also
been applied in growth economics by Desdoigts (1996, 2004).
26Whether we look at the counterfactual distribution of income levels or
growth rates, it should be noted that the eﬀects - in terms of changes in
the location and shape of the distribution - will not be uniform throughout
the growth rate distribution. For example, when we look at growth rates,
the changes observed in the shape of the counterfactual distribution will
depend on the full joint distribution of the macroeconomic policy indicator
and the growth rate. This is easy to see by considering a hypothetical
example. If all countries with intermediate growth rates or better also had
high quality policy, but countries with low growth did not, then imposing
high-quality policy throughout the sample might only aﬀect the lower end of
the distribution. All this implies that changes in the growth rate distribution
cannot be summarized simply by a set of regression coeﬃcients, and looking
at the whole distribution can add useful information.
First of all, we look at actual and counterfactual distributions of growth
rates. The basic idea is to work out what each country’s growth rate would
have been, had all countries experienced the same quality of macroeconomic
policy over 1970-99. First of all, we estimate a growth regression similar to
those in the previous section. This controls for the MRW determinants of
g r o w t h ,r e g i o n a ld u m m i e s ,a n dt h ep o l i c yi n d e xRMACRO.T h ec o e ﬃcient
on RMACRO in this regression is 0.64. We then compute a counterfactual
growth rate g∗
i which is equal to
g∗
i = gi +0 .64(M∗ − RMACROi)
where gi is the observed growth rate, and M∗ is the value of the macro-
economic policy index at the 95th percentile in our sample, corresponding
to Malaysia.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the actual growth rate (the solid line)
and the counterfactual distribution (the dashed line). This clearly shows
how the distribution of growth rates would have shifted to the right if the
quality of macroeconomic policy had been higher. It is worth noting that
the shift takes place throughout the distribution.
This exercise holds the rate of investment constant, but some eﬀects
of better macroeconomic management might occur through the investment
channel. To examine this, we carry out a growth regression which excludes
27investment: hence it now measures the overall eﬀe c to ft h eq u a l i t yo fp o l i c y ,
including eﬀects that work via investment. Figure 6 shows how this approach
modiﬁes the previous diagram. Again, the counterfactual distribution lies
to the right. As might be expected, the eﬀect of policy has become stronger,
and continues to be observed throughout the distribution.
Our growth regressions include a role for initial income, and hence build
in a model of the level of the steady-state growth path as in Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (1992). Under the maintained assumption that all countries grow
a tt h es a m er a t ei nal o n g - r u ne q u i l i b r i u m ,w ec a nu s et h ee s t i m a t e dc o -
eﬃcients for 1970-99 to compute the steady-state distribution of income
per capita. As well as inferring the steady-state distribution of income per
capita implied by the growth regression, we can also construct counterfac-
tual steady-state distributions that would obtain if all countries shared the
same level of the policy indicator.
Figure 7 shows the actual and counterfactual steady-state distributions
of log output. Note that the actual distributions are not necessarily expected
to have the familiar ‘twin peaks’ pattern, because our sample is restricted to
developing countries. Figure 7 shows how better policy might have moved
the distribution of steady-state income levels rightwards, and the potential
magnitude of this eﬀect is clearly substantial. In ﬁgure 8 we extend the
analysis by taking into account the eﬀect of RMACRO on investment. We
ﬁrst run a simple regression of the logarithm of investment on initial income,
initial human capital, regional dummies and RMACRO, and then use this re-
gression to calculate a counterfactual investment rate under the assumption
of high-quality policy. This altered investment rate is used in constructing
the steady-state distribution shown in ﬁgure 8. Relative to ﬁgure 7, the
counterfactual distribution is further to the right, reﬂecting the ﬁnding that
better macroeconomic policy is associated with higher investment. Overall,
the ﬁgures show how better macroeconomic policy could have substantial
eﬀects on the steady-state distribution of income levels.
288 Conclusions
This paper has re-examined the important question of how macroeconomic
policy and growth are related in developing countries. The paper introduces
a new index of the quality of macroeconomic policy, based on aggregating
ﬁve policy indicators using an outlier-robust version of principal components
analysis. By relating growth rates to the new index, we show that growth
is positively associated with the quality of policy, and the eﬀect is sizeable:
a one-standard-deviation change in the index is found to raise the annual
growth rate by somewhere between 0.5 and 0.7 percentage points over a
thirty-year period.
We have also investigated the robustness of this eﬀect using recently in-
troduced Bayesian methods. Consistent with previous work on this topic,
the evidence that our speciﬁc measure of policy matters for growth, when
we allow for a wide range of other growth determinants, is not always ro-
bust. The strength of the evidence depends on the sample of countries, and
particularly on the exclusion or inclusion of other proxies for government
policy in the set of candidate predictors. But taken as a whole, the evidence
presented in this paper suggests that government policy does help to explain
diﬀerences in growth rates among developing countries.
9 Appendix 1
This appendix brieﬂy discusses the Dollar (1992) measure of outward orien-
tation, which has sometimes been criticized, at least as a measure of trade
policies. One issue is whether Dollar’s procedures can reliably control for the
determinants of non-tradeables prices. This has been discussed by Falvey
and Gemmell (1998, 1999). They suggest that Dollar’s approach can be a
reasonable approximation on average, the main exceptions occuring when
the GDP per capita of a country is a weak proxy for its relative factor
endowments.
Assuming for now that the Dollar procedure is eﬀective in modelling
non-tradeables prices, a remaining question is whether diﬀerences in trade-
ables prices should be attributed to trade restrictions, or to other factors.
29Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) provide an especially useful discussion of the
strict assumptions that are needed for Dollar’s approach to capture trade
restrictions. They argue that international variation in price levels will be
partly driven by trade costs, which in turn could reﬂect geographic charac-
teristics. They show that around half the variation in the original Dollar
measure can be explained by a combination of the black market exchange
rate premium, regional dummies, and two geographic indicators - one mea-
suring the ratio of coastal length to land area, and the other a dummy for
tropical countries. Overall they conclude that the cross-section variation
in price levels is likely to be driven by a combination of nominal exchange
rate policies and geographic characteristics, rather than variation in trade
barriers.
In background work for this paper, we have found that the partial cor-
relations between Dollar’s index, geographic characteristics and measures
of market access are generally fragile, but the index is strongly correlated
with tropical location, for reasons that are not immediately clear. There is
no obvious reason why closeness to the equator should be associated with
unusually high transport costs, and more direct measures of market access
lack explanatory power. This suggests that the correlation between Dollar’s
index and tropical location is driven by something other than the geography
of transport costs, perhaps the association between tropical location and rel-
atively weak institutions that was identiﬁed by Hall and Jones (1999) and
Acemoglu et al. (2001).
The OVERVALU variable in our paper is essentially Dollar’s measure for
1976-85 extended forwards and backwards using real exchange rate move-
ments, and then averaged. With the above discussion in mind, our main-
tained assumption will be that the cross-section variation in OVERVALU
primarily reﬂects diﬀerences in national exchange rate policies. Given that
other interpretations are possible, we brieﬂy examine what happens if we
omit OVERVALU from the set of indicators used in section 3 of the paper.
If we recalculate the principal components for four indicators rather than
ﬁve, we obtain the following index:
30MACROND =0 .332 ∗ SURPLUS − 0.516 ∗ INFLA (5)
−0.615 ∗ BMP − 0.495 ∗ ERATE
again in terms of standardized variables. This composite indicator is
very highly correlated with our preferred measures MACRO (r =0 .97)a n d
RMACRO (r =0 .98). Hence, our main results will all be robust to omission
of OVERVALU from the policy index. This robustness is likely to reﬂect,
at least in part, the high correlation that Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) note
between OVERVALU and a variable with a clearer interpretation, the black
market exchange rate premium, BMP.
10 Appendix 2
In this appendix we brieﬂy discuss the method used to obtain the kernel
density plots in the paper. The plots we present use the Epanechnikov kernel
but, in general, density estimates are not sensitive to the precise choice of
kernel. The choice of bandwidth is more important, and especially so in our
application, given the small number of observations.
We start by estimating each density using the bandwidth that would
m i n i m i z et h em e a ni n t e g r a t e ds q u a r ee r r o ri ft h ed a t aw e r eG a u s s i a na n da
Gaussian kernel were used (this is the default setting for the kdensity com-
mand in Stata 8.2). This is well-known to sometimes lead to oversmoothing
and can obscure important structure - for example, it can make a bimodal
distribution appear unimodal. To investigate this we then repeatedly lower
the halfwidth of the kernel (the width of the density window around each
point) to see if there is any further structure. The ﬁnal plots that we present
in the paper use a halfwidth that is chosen to give a reasonably smooth den-
sity plot without obscuring structure such as distinct modes. Given the
small sample sizes we are often using, we prefer this approach to automated
methods of bandwidth selection.
3111 Appendix 3
The 72-country sample in our BMA uses imputed data for a small set of
variables. We use a regression-based approach to imputation, in which data
on other variables is used to estimate a regression for the variable of interest.
Where the variable is missing for a particular country, the empty cell is ﬁlled
using the ﬁtted value for that cell. Our default predictors are three regional
dummies from the SDM data set (for sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America
and East Asia) and absolute latitude; occasionally other SDM variables are
used, depending on the context. The full details of the predictors used for
speciﬁc variables are shown in Appendix Table 4.
We now discuss the computational aspects of BMA in more detail. A
key problem in applying these methods is the vast range of possible models.
For example, with 30 candidate predictors, there are more than a thousand
m i l l i o np o s s i b l em o d e l s( t h ee x a c tﬁgure is 230 ≈ 1.074 × 109). Thus, most
applications of BMA to sizeable data sets do not average over all possible
models, but use a search algorithm to identify the subset of models with
greatest relevance. We use two methods to establish this subset. The ﬁrst
is the Occam’s Window technique described in Madigan and Raftery (1994)
and Raftery et al. (1997). This excludes from the averaging procedure any
model that is much less likely than the model with the highest posterior
model probability. Our application of this excludes all models that have a
posterior model probability lower than 1/100 the posterior model probability
of the leading model. Hence, models that fall into this category are treated
as if their posterior model probability can be rounded down to zero.
This tends to reduce massively the number of models used in the av-
eraging process, but does not in itself solve the problem of identifying the
models that are likely to lie within Occam’s Window. In the case of linear
regression, however, a branch-and-bound algorithm can be used to identify
quickly a set of leading models; see Miller (2002, p. 53-55) for a description
of how this works. To implement this procedure, we use a version of the
bicreg software written for the R statistical language. The bicreg code
was originally written for the language S by Adrian Raftery and revised by
Chris Volinsky, and then modiﬁed for R by Ian Painter. The code we use is
32available online at http://www.research.att.com/~volinsky/bma.html
Some of the BMA results mentioned in the main text make use of an al-
ternative approach. This uses the MC3.REG c o d ew r i t t e nb yJ e n n i f e rH o e t i n g
and again translated to R by Ian Painter. Rather than using a model selec-
tion algorithm to identify leading models, this code visits diﬀerent models
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, as in Madigan and York (1995),
and uses the results of the chain to compute posterior model probabilities.
The approach is described in more detail in Hoeting et al. (1996). Our im-
plementation of this approach uses 40,000 iterations of the sampler and sets
the parameter π to 0.10, which corresponds to the probability any given
observation is an outlier. (Hoeting et al. only use a value as high as 0.10
for samples below 50 observations, but we judge outliers to be likely in this
particular application, especially given the skewness of some of the can-
didate predictors.) All other parameter settings follow the default choices
recommended by Hoeting et al. (1996).
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The solid line shows a hypothetical distribution for countries with bad policies, the dashed line 
for countries with good policies. 
 

























This graph shows three Tukey box-plots for three groups, from bad policy (group 1) to good 
policy (group 3). The horizontal line in the box indicates the median growth rate for that group. 
The policy classification is based on RMACRO. Figure 3 – Kernel density plots  
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The solid line shows the distribution for countries with bad policies, the dashed line for 
countries with good policies. The policy classification is based on RMACRO. 
 

























This graph shows three Tukey box-plots for three groups, from bad policy (group 1) to good 
policy (group 3). The horizontal line in the box indicates the median growth rate for that group. 
The policy classification is based on the black market premium, BMP. Figure 5 – Actual and counterfactual distribution of growth rates 




The solid line shows the actual distribution, the dashed line the counterfactual. 
  
Figure 6 – Actual and counterfactual distribution of growth rates (including 
investment effects) 




The solid line shows the actual distribution, the dashed line the counterfactual. Figure 7 –Steady-state income levels (in logs) 




The solid line shows the actual distribution, the dashed line the counterfactual. 
 
 
Figure 8 – Steady-state distribution (in logs) with investment effects 





 Table 1: Principal Component Analysis 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Variable Expected        MACRO  RMACRO   MACROOL 
   sign  1st PC 2nd PC  1st PC 2nd PC 1st PC  2nd PC
SURPLUS +  0.484 0.579 0.340 0.297 0.276  0.768
INFLA -  -0.647 0.437 -0.744 0.172 -0.727  0.161
BMP -  -0.848 0.184 -0.888 -0.034 -0.843  0.120
OVERVALU -  -0.503 -0.633 -0.395 -0.951 -0.327  -0.654
ERATE -  -0.688 0.232 -0.653 -0.164 -0.665  0.311
Number of countries    78    78   75 
% Variance explained  41.94 20.29 41.27 24.00 37.29  23.10
 
Notes: Numbers shown are the correlations between principal components (PCs) and the 
corresponding variables. Numbers in bold indicate the highest correlations between a given 
principal component and corresponding variables. Column (3) is based on a classical PCA but 
excluding Guyana, Nicaragua and Sudan. These are the outliers suggested by the diagnostic 





Table 2: Simple correlations among GDP growth 
and various aggregated macroeconomic policy indices 
 
 
 RGDP7099C  MACRO RMACRO MACROOL BD  ELR7097 
RGDP7099C 1.0000           
MACRO 0.4715  1.0000        
RMACRO 0.4194  0.9759 1.0000      
MACROOL 0.4087  0.9952 0.9913 1.0000   
BD 0.6618  0.6658 0.6226 0.5848 1.0000   




Table 3 – Growth Regressions 
       
Column    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Observations  70 70 70 70 60 
       
RMACRO    0.71 0.49 0.64 0.64 
    (0.30) (0.31) (0.27) (0.29) 
Initial  income  -1.10 -0.26 -0.80 -1.04 -1.15 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.42) 
Population  growth  -0.21   -0.19 -0.12 -0.10 
  (0.23)   (0.22) (0.25) (0.28) 
Investment  1.07   1.10 0.83 0.84 
  (0.32)   (0.34) (0.32) (0.48) 
Literacy  0.68     0.88  
  (0.31)     (0.34)  
Average  schooling      0.79 
      ( 0 . 2 7 )  
       
R2  0.51 0.37 0.51 0.57 0.55 
Regression  s.e.  1.56 1.75 1.57 1.47 1.58 
Heteroscedasticity       
    Breusch-Pagan  0.32  0.02  0.07  0.27  0.18 
    White  0.66  0.19  0.03  0.64  0.35 
Ramsey  RESET 0.90 0.58 0.02 0.68 0.24 
 
 
MacKinnon-White heteroskedasticity-consistent (hc3) standard errors reported in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate over 1970-99, in percentage points. The 
explanatory variables are standardized to have a standard deviation of one, and so the 
coefficients represent the effect of a one-standard-deviation change on the annual growth rate. 
All regressions include five regional dummies, for East Asia and the Pacific; Middle East and 
North Africa; South Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa; and Latin America and the Caribbean. Constant 
and coefficients on regional dummies not reported. ‘Heteroscedasticity’ reports p-values 

























Appendix Table 1: List of countries  
 
 
Latin America and Caribbean    East Asia and the Pacific 
Argentina   Fiji 
Bolivia   Indonesia 
Brazil   Malaysia 
Chile    Papua New Guinea 
Colombia   Philippines 
Costa Rica    Singapore 
Dominican Republic    South Korea  
Ecuador   Thailand 
El Salvador     
Guatemala   Sub-Saharan Africa 
Guyana   Benin 
Haiti   Botswana 
Honduras   Burkina  Faso 
Jamaica   Burundi 
Mexico   Cameroon 
Nicaragua    Central African Republic 
Panama   Chad 
Paraguay   Congo,  Democratic  Republic 
Peru   Congo,  Republic 
Trinidad and Tobago    Ethiopia 
Uruguay   Gabon 
Venezuela   Ghana 
   Kenya 
Middle East and North Africa   Lesotho 
Algeria   Liberia 
Cyprus   Madagascar 
Egypt   Malawi 
Iran   Mali 
Israel   Mauritania 
Jordan   Mauritius 
Morocco   Niger 
Oman   Nigeria 
Syria   Rwanda 
Tunisia   Senegal 
Turkey   Sierra  Leone 
Yemen   Somalia 
   Sudan 
South Asia   Togo 
Bangladesh   Uganda 
India   Zambia 
Nepal   Zimbabwe 
Pakistan    
Sri Lanka     
  
 
Appendix Table 2: Variables and definitions 
 
 
Variable Description  Sources 
INVEST  Natural logarithm of investment share in GDP, 1970-99  Penn World Table 6.1 
POPG  Natural logarithm of average annual growth rate of population aged 15-64, 
1970-99, plus 0.05.  
World Bank (2004a) 
SCHOOL70  Natural logarithm of average years of schooling at all educational levels of 
population aged over 15 in 1970.  
Barro and Lee (2000) 
LITERACY  Natural log of (100-illiteracy rate of population aged over 15 in 1970)  World Bank (2004a) 
RGDPPC70  Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita (rgdpch) in 1970.   Penn World Table 6.1 
RGDP7099C  Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita (rgdpch) in 1999 minus same 
variable for 1970. This is divided by 29, to obtain annual growth rates.  
Penn World Table 6.1 
RGDP7099W  Natural log of real GDP per worker (rgdpwok) in 1999 minus that of 1970. 
This is divided by 29, to obtain annual growth rates.  
Penn World Table 6.1 
Regional 
dummies 
Five regions: East Asia and the Pacific (RGNEAP), Middle East and North 
Africa (RGNMENA), South Asia (RGNSA), Sub-Saharan Africa 
(RGNSSA), and Latin America and Caribbean (RGNLAC) 
Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2002) 
MACRO  The first principal component from a classical principal components 
analysis of SURPLUS, INFLA, BMP, OVERVALU and ERATE. Higher 
values mean better policy outcomes.  
see text 
RMACRO  As above, but from a robust principal components analysis.   see text 
SURPLUS  Mean central government budget surplus as a share of GDP, 1970-99  World Bank (2004a) 
DEBT  Natural log of mean central government debt over GDP, 1970-99  World Bank (2004a) 
INFLA  Natural log of (1+inflation rate based on median GDP deflator)   World Bank (2004a) 
REALI  Mean lending rate adjusted by GDP deflator.  World Bank (2004a) 
BMP  Natural log of (1+mean black market premium)  Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2002) 
OVERVALU  Natural log of mean overvaluation index. Dollar (1992) provides data for 
1976-85. Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) update the data to 1999. 
Dollar (1992) and 
Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2002) 
ERATE  Variation of the Dollar real exchange rate measure around its mean.   Dollar (1992) 
POLITY  Measures degree of democracy. The POLITY score is the democratic score 
minus autocratic score. 0-10 scale, where higher values mean higher 
degree of democracy. We use the mean value 1970-1999.  
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2000) 
POLCON  Extent of political constraints in policy-making process. Higher value 
imply stronger constraints. Mean value 1970-1999.  
Henisz (2000) 
EXPRISK  Protection against expropriation risk. Higher values mean lower risk. 
Mean value 1985-1995. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) 
GOVKKZ  A composite index of overall quality of governance. We use the mean of 
indices for voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule and law, and corruption, during the 
period 1996-2000. Higher values mean higher-quality governance.  
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2005) 
 
Note: For a description of the SDM controls used as candidate predictors in our 
implementation of Bayesian Model Averaging, see Table 1 of Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). 
As discussed in the main text, we restrict attention to the 31 variables with a posterior 
inclusion probability greater than 4% in their Table 2. 
Appendix Table 3:  Descriptive statistics 
                                 
Variable Observation  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
RGDP7099C  77 0.0116  0.0210  -0.0526 0.0636 
RGDP7099W  76 0.0098  0.0207  -0.0564 0.0678 
MACRO  78 0.0000  1.0000  -3.2762 1.9651 
RMACRO  78 0.0000  1.0000  -2.9744 1.8367 
MACROOL  75 0.0000  1.0000  -2.4166 2.0575 
SURPLUS 88  -4.1989  5.4175  -26.9389  16.2312 
DEBT  71 3.7845  0.7485  2.0096 5.6481 
INFLA  90 2.4243  0.7430  0.9092 4.6012 
REALI 85  7.1370  13.0313  -38.9671  71.0281 
BMP  89 2.9829  1.6887  -0.0363 7.8161 
OVERVALU  82 4.7428  0.3322  4.0934 5.9453 
ERATE  81 0.1620  0.0987  0.0400 0.5000 
SCHOOL70  67 0.8184  0.7848  -1.6190 2.0910 
LITERACY  86 3.6792  0.6941  1.7487 4.5559 
INVEST  86 2.4652  0.5540  0.7966 3.8144 
RGDPPC70  79 6.4498  0.6971  5.1888 7.9270 
POPG  90 -2.5715  0.0901  -2.8942 -2.3915 
RGNEAP  90 0.1333  0.3418  0.0000 1.0000 
RGNECA  90 0.0222  0.1482  0.0000 1.0000 
RGNMENA  90 0.1333  0.3418  0.0000 1.0000 
RGNSA  90 0.0556  0.2303  0.0000 1.0000 
RGNSSA  90 0.4000  0.4926  0.0000 1.0000 
RGNLAC  90 0.2444  0.4322  0.0000 1.0000 
BDDATA  73 1.2277  0.9196  -1.0254 3.6353 
ELRBDC7097  75 1.5146  0.8546  -0.7699 3.3234 
ELR7097  75 1.4320  0.7910  -0.9231 3.2636 
 
 Appendix Table 4 – Imputation of missing cases in the SDM data 
 
SDM control variables  Variables used in predictive regression   Number of 
imputed 
observations 
Log investment price, 1960-64   ABSLATIT, EAST, LAAM, SAFRICA  1 
Fraction of area in tropics  ABSLATIT, EAST, LAAM, SAFRICA  3 
Log population density (coast), 1960s  LDENS60, LANDAREA, LANDLOCK, ABSLATIT, 
EAST, LAAM, SAFRICA 
3 
Malaria prevalence, 1960s  ABSLATIT, EAST, LAAM, SAFRICA  5 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization  ABSLATIT, EAST, LAAM, SAFRICA  1 
Government share of GDP, 1960-64  GVR61, ABSLATIT, EAST, LAAM, SAFRICA  1 
Fraction of population in tropics  ABSLATIT, EAST, LAAM, SAFRICA  3 
Export share of primary exports in 1970  ABSLATIT, EAST, LAAM, SAFRICA  1 
Government investment relative to GDP, 
1970-74 




Missing data for the above variables in our BMA exercises are replaced with fitted 
values from simple regressions. The table shows the variables in the regressions and the 
number of imputed observations. The explanatory variables in each regression are the 
stated combination of absolute latitude (ABSLATIT), an East Asian dummy (EAST), a 
Latin American dummy (LAAM), a sub-Saharan Africa dummy (SAFRICA), the log of 
population density in 1960 (LDENS60), land area (LANDAREA), a dummy for 
landlocked countries (LANDLOCK), the ratio of government consumption to GDP in 
1961 (GVR61), and real GDP per capita in 1970 (RGDPPC70). 